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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 A citizen's advocacy group, "For Our Children's 
Ultimate Safety" ("FOCUS"), and two of the group's members, 
Jacqueline Colville and Catherine Silvio (collectively, the 
"plaintiffs"), appeal from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting a motion 
to dismiss their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Family 
Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and a 
judge of that court.  Their claim arises out of gag orders 
entered during a celebrated child custody case, In re Byron 
Griffin, No. 1608-92 (Pa. C.P. filed Aug. 21, 1992) (the "Baby 
Byron" case), currently pending before the court of common pleas. 
The gag orders prohibited the parties to that case from 
discussing the case with the public.  FOCUS (but not the 
individual plaintiffs) attempted to intervene in the Baby Byron 
case, arguing that the gag orders violated its rights under the 
First Amendment.   
 In a quick series of events, (1) the court of common 
pleas rebuffed FOCUS' attempt to intervene, (2) the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court refused to entertain FOCUS' motion for a writ of 
mandamus, and (3) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied FOCUS' 
petition to exercise its King's Bench jurisdiction to declare the 
gag orders unconstitutional.  FOCUS then joined forces with the 
two individual plaintiffs and filed this § 1983 suit in federal 
district court, alleging that the state court and its judge 
violated their First Amendment rights.  The district court 
dismissed all claims against the state court on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds.  It then dismissed the claims against the 
judge, holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and also that it should abstain 
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 The plaintiffs appeal only the district court's Rooker-
Feldman and Younger rulings.  The plaintiffs do not appeal the 
district court's decision to dismiss their claims against the 
state court on Eleventh Amendment grounds.  We hold that neither 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nor Younger bars the plaintiffs' 
federal challenge to the judge's gag orders, and we will 
accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 FOCUS is a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania unincorporated 
association consisting of some fifty birth and foster parents 
whose goal is to make the Allegheny County Children and Youth 
Services ("CYS") more accountable, accessible and understandable. 
One of FOCUS' activities is to acquire information about the 
operations, policies and practices of CYS by listening to and 
advising individuals affected by the agency's activities.  FOCUS 
has been interested in the highly-publicized1 Baby Byron case, a 
child dependency and adoption proceeding which involves a dispute 
between white foster parents and the biological mother over the 
placement of two young black children. 
 FOCUS claims that its attempts to keep informed about 
the Baby Byron case have been hampered by several gag orders. The 
first order, issued on January 24, 1994, states: 
[I]t is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED 
that the parties and their counsel and others 
having knowledge or information whatsoever 
regarding this case are prohibited from 
releasing any such knowledge or information, 
in whole or in part, to the media or 
otherwise. 
(App. at 16.)  The second gag order, issued on November 1, 1994, 
directs that: 
[The] parties are to have no contact with the 
public vis a vis discussing or referring to 
this case in any public context or forum. 
(App. at 18.)  The judge reaffirmed the second order on November 
14, 1994, and it remains in effect today. 
 The parties to the Baby Byron case have not challenged 
the gag orders.  The plaintiffs allege that this is because the 
judge has threatened to deny custody of the child to any party 
that publicly discusses the case.  The plaintiffs further allege 
that the child's foster parents, Karen and Michael Derzack, 
"recently released a book detailing their experiences with Byron 
                     
1
  E.g., Alyssa Gabbay, Baby Byron Case Illustrates Black-and-
White Issue of Adoption, L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1995, at A22 
(stating that the case has focused national attention on the 
issue of transracial adoption and has inspired nationwide media 
coverage, a book, legislation, and a recent motion picture). 
and their frustration with CYS and the courts," thus indicating 
that the Derzacks were willing to talk at some point prior to the 
entry of the gag orders.  (App. at 9.) 
 On November 14, 1994, FOCUS (without Colville and 
Silvio) moved to intervene in the Baby Byron case for the limited 
purpose of challenging the gag orders on free speech grounds. The 
judge's tipstaff informed FOCUS that the judge would not accept 
FOCUS' intervention motion and that FOCUS would not be permitted 
to present argument in opposition to the gag orders. FOCUS claims 
that the judge refused even to accept the motion to intervene so 
that he would not have to deny it formally. 
 FOCUS immediately filed an "Emergency Petition For a 
Writ of Mandamus" with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 
seeking an order compelling the judge to permit FOCUS to 
intervene in the Baby Byron case and to participate in that 
afternoon's scheduled hearing.  The superior court immediately 
denied that motion for lack of jurisdiction. 
 FOCUS responded on November 16, 1994, by filing a 
"Petition For Extraordinary Relief And Request For Expedited 
Decision" with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, seeking to invoke 
the court's extraordinary "King's Bench" jurisdiction pursuant to 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 502, 726.  Unlike the Emergency 
Petition to permit intervention, however, FOCUS asked the court 
to issue an order declaring the gag orders unconstitutional.  The 
supreme court denied the Petition for Extraordinary Relief on 
December 12, 1994 without explanation. 
 On December 19, 1994, FOCUS joined with individual 
plaintiffs Silvio and Colville to file their verified complaint 
and motion for a temporary restraining order in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The 
defendants moved to dismiss the next day for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  On December 22, 1994, the district court 
held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and granted it for the 
reasons stated above.  This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 The parties do not raise the issue but, before we can 
proceed further on the merits, we must satisfy ourselves that the 
plaintiffs have standing to present their free speech challenges 
to the gag orders.  E.g., Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 n.1 
(3d Cir.) (considering standing issue sua sponte and noting that 
the courts of appeals have an independent obligation to ensure 
that federal jurisdiction is present in cases coming before 
them), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 473 (1992).  "The party invoking 
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing" the 
elements of standing, and "each element must be supported in the 
same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence 
required at the successive stages of the litigation."  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  Thus, "when 
standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, we 'accept 
as true all material allegations in the complaint, and . . . 
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.'" 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quoting Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). 
 The standing issue arises in this case because the gag 
orders merely constrain the speech of the parties and the 
attorneys to the Baby Byron case; the plaintiffs do not complain 
that the orders affirmatively constrain their speech in any way.2 
Of course, that alone does not mean the plaintiffs' case fails 
for lack of standing.  "We have routinely found, as have other 
courts, that third parties have standing to challenge protective 
orders and confidentiality orders in an effort to obtain access 
to information or judicial proceedings."  Pansy v. Borough of 
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted); 
see also In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir.) 
(noting the rights of potential recipients of speech to challenge 
the abridgment of that speech), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 
(1988). 
 That putative recipients of speech usually have 
standing to challenge orders silencing would-be speakers does not 
necessarily mean that the plaintiffs in this case have standing, 
however.  The plaintiffs still must show that the gag orders have 
caused them injury in fact and that their injury is likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) (setting forth the three 
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  The first order does speak to "others having knowledge or 
information regarding this case."  The plaintiffs do not claim 
that this order restrains their own speech, however.  Instead, 
they complain that the gag orders restrain the speech of the Baby 
Byron parties and their lawyers. 
elements necessary to satisfy "the irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing"). 
 Accordingly, courts have found that third parties have 
standing to challenge a gag order only when there is reason to 
believe that the individual subject to the gag order is willing 
to speak and is being restrained from doing so.  E.g., In re Dow 
Jones, 842 F.2d at 607 (determining whether the recipients have 
standing required the court first to examine "[w]hether the 
[plaintiff] news agencies are actually potential receivers of 
otherwise restrained speech"); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 787 n.12 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that 
the third party had standing to challenge a protective order 
because "far from agreeing to the protective order, the 
plaintiffs to this action have opposed the protective order at 
every stage" and the speech, therefore, would be available); 
Radio & Television News Ass'n v. District Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 
1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the press lacks standing to 
assert the free speech rights of another when the person subject 
to the gag order has not challenged it). 
 Our cases are consistent with this view.  In Pansy, for 
example, we employed an "available material" approach when we 
inquired into the practical effect of vacating the order of 
confidentiality at issue in that case; we noted that the 
plaintiff newspapers "ha[d] an interest in vacating the Order of 
Confidentiality" because they then could obtain the required 
information through Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act.  23 F.3d at 
784.  Similarly, in United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 845 
(3d Cir. 1978), we held that the intervening newsgathering 
organizations and reporters had standing to challenge the 
district court's order excluding the public from a pretrial 
suppression hearing and sealing the record of that hearing. 
There, speech was in fact going on and was thus "available," but 
the challenged order denied the intervenors the right to receive 
it. 
 Looking at the allegations in the verified complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs here, there are 
reasons to conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately met a 
"willingness of the speaker" requirement for standing at this 
stage of the litigation.  As we have noted, while neither party 
to the Baby Byron case is on the record as being opposed to the 
gag orders, the Derzacks at least were willing to talk at some 
point prior to the entry of the gag orders; The complaint alleges 
that the Derzacks "recently released a book detailing their 
experiences with Byron and their frustration with CYS and the 
courts."  (App. at 9.)  Moreover, the complaint further alleges 
that the judge "has threatened to remove Byron from the Derzack's 
[sic] home if the Derzacks appear publicly to promote their book 
or otherwise discuss their case."  (App. at 10.)  It is 
reasonable to infer from these allegations that the Derzacks are 
willing but restrained speakers who dare not challenge the gag 
orders for fear of reprisal from the judge.  At this stage, we 
must accept these allegations and this permissible inference in 
the plaintiffs' favor. 
 In sum, we find that the plaintiffs have alleged facts 
in their verified complaint which would be sufficient to survive 
a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.  It follows that we may 
proceed to entertain this appeal.  Nonetheless, the plaintiffs 
upon remand still bear the burden of proving standing whenever it 
is challenged.  See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 
F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[A] court's refusal to dismiss an 
action for lack of standing does not relieve the plaintiff of the 
burden of actually proving standing where a defendant contests 
the factual basis for standing."), rev'd on other grounds, 504 
U.S. 555 (1992).  The plaintiffs must prove that the Baby Byron 
parties are willing to talk publicly about that case.  If the 
district court, at any point, concludes to the contrary on the 
basis of an appropriate record, then it should proceed no 
further.3 
 
III. 
 We exercise plenary review over an order granting a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 
256, 264 (3d Cir. 1991).  Because the district court dismissed 
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  The district court may choose to address the standing issue in 
a pre-trial proceeding or at trial.  See Doherty v. Rutgers Sch. 
of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 898 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1981); 13A 
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.15, 
at 97-104 (1984 & Supp. 1995).  Regardless of the procedure 
chosen ultimately to determine this issue, however, our decision 
here finding standing based on the allegations of the complaint 
neither forecloses the district court from reexamining the issue 
nor absolves the plaintiffs from carrying their burden of proof. 
the complaint before the defendants filed an answer, we review 
whether the complaint alleges facts on its face which, if taken 
as true, would be sufficient to invoke the district court's 
jurisdiction.  Licata v. United States Postal Serv., 33 F.3d 259, 
260 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 The district court ruled that the plaintiffs' suit was 
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine provides that "federal district courts lack subject 
matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state's 
highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are 
'inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a 
judicial proceeding.'"  Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (alteration in original) (quoting District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)); see 
also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).  We have 
interpreted the doctrine to encompass final decisions of lower 
state courts.  Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass'n v. Port Auth., 973 
F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992).  We have also concluded that 
"Rooker-Feldman does not bar individual constitutional claims by 
persons not parties to earlier state court litigation . . . ." 
Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 When a plaintiff seeks to litigate a claim in a federal 
court, the existence of a state court judgment in another case 
bars the federal proceeding under Rooker-Feldman only when 
entertaining the federal court claim would be the equivalent of 
an appellate review of that order.  For that reason, Rooker-
Feldman applies only when in order to grant the federal plaintiff 
the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the 
state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action 
that would render that judgment ineffectual.  Marks v. Stinson, 
19 F.3d 873, 886 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding Rooker-Feldman 
inapplicable where "the district court could (and did) find that 
[the plaintiffs'] constitutional claims had merit without also 
finding that the [state] court erred").  As the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals wrote recently: 
A federal district court has jurisdiction 
over general constitutional challenges if 
these claims are not inextricably intertwined 
with the claims asserted in state court.  A 
claim is inextricably intertwined if the 
federal claim succeeds only to the extent 
that the state court wrongly decided the 
issues before it.  In other words, Rooker-
Feldman precludes a federal action if the 
relief requested in the federal action would 
effectively reverse the state decision or 
void its ruling.  Accordingly, to determine 
whether Rooker-Feldman bars [plaintiff's] 
federal suit requires determining exactly 
what the state court held . . . .  If the 
relief requested in the federal action 
requires determining that the state court 
decision is wrong or would void the state 
court's ruling, then the issues are 
inextricably intertwined and the district 
court has no subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear the suit. 
 
Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 
1995) (citations omitted). 
 Three state courts were involved in FOCUS' attempts to 
lift the gag orders issued in the Baby Byron case: the Family 
Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
No one claims that the superior court's refusal to hear the 
plaintiffs' claim was an "adjudication" of FOCUS' First Amendment 
claim for Rooker-Feldman purposes.  Instead, the defendants 
concentrate on the common pleas and the supreme court decisions, 
arguing that they were "adjudications" which were "inextricably 
intertwined" with FOCUS' First Amendment claims for the purposes 
of Rooker-Feldman.  We address each of those decisions in turn. 
 The judge allegedly took two actions in the common 
pleas proceeding: (1) his initial decision to issue the gag 
orders and (2) his thwarting of FOCUS' attempt to intervene.  The 
first set of decisions can be dealt with quickly.  None of the 
plaintiffs was a party at the time the judge issued the original 
gag orders.  As a result, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not 
have barred the plaintiffs--once the gag orders issued 
--from proceeding straight to federal court to challenge their 
constitutionality.  Valenti, 962 F.2d at 298.4 
 The plaintiffs argue that the judge's thwarting of 
FOCUS' attempt to intervene should not be viewed as an 
adjudication.  While one could debate whether his tipstaff's 
refusal to accept the motion is an adjudication, we think there 
is a far easier way to resolve the matter.  The crucial issue is 
not whether the action itself is "adjudicative."  Instead, the 
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  The defendants argue that Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiffs' 
federal claims in part because the First Amendment issues were 
"inextricably intertwined" with the judge's gag order decisions. 
That is correct inasmuch as the parties to the Baby Byron case 
could not bring a First Amendment case in federal court 
challenging the gag orders.   Under Valenti, however, Rooker-
Feldman does not prohibit third parties--such as plaintiffs  
here--from challenging a state court gag order in federal court. 
issue is (1) whether the judge adjudicated FOCUS' First Amendment 
claim and, if not, (2) whether his decision (if any) is 
inextricably intertwined with FOCUS' First Amendment claim.   
 The judge did not decide FOCUS' constitutional 
challenge to the gag orders or any other issue that is a 
predicate to the claim in the federal proceeding.  In short, we 
have no reason to believe that in order for FOCUS to prevail in 
federal court, the court must decide "that the state court 
decision [on intervention] is wrong."  Charchenko, 47 F.3d at 
983.  In this respect, this situation is indistinguishable from 
the one we faced in Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1994). 
In that case, some of the plaintiffs had filed petitions with the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas asking relief on the basis of 
fraud and alleged constitutional violations in connection with an 
election.  The court refused to entertain their claims asserting 
that it lacked jurisdiction to do so.  We held that a subsequent 
proceeding in the district court was not barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine: 
[T]he court was not barred under Rooker-
Feldman from hearing the constitutional and 
fraud claims of Marks and the Republican 
State Committee ("RSC") because these claims 
had not been determined by the state court, 
nor were they inextricably intertwined with a 
prior state court decision.  Specifically, 
the court of common pleas dismissed Marks' 
and the RSC's claims without reaching the 
merits.  Therefore, the district court was 
not faced with a situation where it was asked 
to review a determination of the state court. 
. . .  Here, the district court could (and 
did) find that Marks' and the RSC's fraud and 
constitutional claims had merit without also 
finding that the court of common pleas erred 
when it dismissed their proceedings. 
Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d at 886 n.11.   
 Thus, had FOCUS stopped its state court activity at 
that point and filed this suit in federal district court, the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not have barred it from challenging 
the constitutionality of the gag orders in federal court.   
 Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision bars 
FOCUS' federal case presents a similar issue.  FOCUS' motion 
before the supreme court was filed as a "Petition For 
Extraordinary Relief And Request For Expedited Decision."  It 
asked the supreme court to: 
 a. Assume [King's Bench] jurisdiction over the herein 
matter pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§502 and 726, and 
Pa. Const. Art. V, §10(a); 
 
 b. Shorten the time to three (3) days for the filing 
of answers to the herein petition; 
 
 c. Issue forthwith an order declaring the gag orders 
to be an unconstitutional restraint of speech; 
 
 d. Issue forthwith an order vacating the gag orders; 
and 
 
 e. Award such other relief as is just and 
appropriate. 
 
(App. at 68-69.)  By order of December 12, 1994, the supreme 
court denied that petition without giving any reason. 
 Once again, we conclude that a federal court 
determining the constitutionality of the gag orders would not 
need to conclude that the state court's decision was erroneous. 
Nor would it be required to invalidate in any way the state 
court's dispositive order.   
 The King's Bench jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has been characterized by that court as "our 
extraordinary jurisdiction"--a discretionary jurisdiction to "be 
invoked sparingly, and only in cases 'involving an issue of 
immediate public importance.'"  Washington County Comm'rs v. 
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 417 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1980) 
(quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 726).  As the court explained 
in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 387 A.2d 425, 430 
n.11 (Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979):   
 
[T]he presence of an issue of immediate 
public importance is not alone sufficient to 
justify extraordinary relief.  As in requests 
for writs of prohibition and mandamus, we 
will not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction 
unless the record clearly demonstrates a 
petitioner's rights.  Even a clear showing 
that a petitioner is aggrieved does not 
assure that this Court will exercise its 
discretion to grant the requested relief. See 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 
92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972). 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's order of December 12, 
1994, is consistent with an exercised discretion on its part not 
to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction.  Its failure even to 
comment on the constitutional issue strongly suggests that this 
was the basis for its disposition.  It is sufficient for present 
purposes, however, to note that nothing in the record of the 
proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
affirmatively indicates that it adjudicated the First Amendment 
issue that the plaintiffs have presented to the district court in 
this case. 
 Where the extraordinary jurisdiction of a court is 
unsuccessfully invoked and the court does not expressly 
adjudicate the tendered merits issue, the general rule is that 
there is no preclusive effect and the petitioning party is free 
subsequently to pursue his claim in any appropriate forum.  E.g., 
Hiley v. United States, 807 F.2d 623, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986).  While we have found no case of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania directly on point, we are confident 
that it would give its December 12th order no claim preclusive 
effect.  Accordingly, we are not bound to give it claim 
preclusive effect. 
 While this does not directly answer the Rooker-Feldman 
issue presented by the December 12th order, we think it points 
the way.  As we have previously noted, "the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine has a close affinity to the principles embodied in the 
legal concepts of claim and issue preclusion."  Valenti, 962 F.2d 
at 297.  Moreover, because the December 12th order did not affect 
the legal relationship before the parties and did not preclude 
further proceedings on the constitutional issue tendered, it is 
clear that the district court in this case is not being asked 
here to play the role of a reviewing court.  Not only is the 
district court being asked to adjudicate an issue distinct from 
any the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly adjudicated, it 
is also being asked to grant relief that is entirely consistent 
with the existence of the December 12th order. 
 For these reasons, we conclude that this issue is 
governed by the principles set forth in Marks v. Stinson, even 
though the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, unlike the court of 
common pleas in Marks, declined to give a reason for its 
disposition.  Accordingly, we hold that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine presents no bar to the plaintiffs' federal court 
action.5 
 
IV. 
 The district court also held that it should abstain 
from asserting jurisdiction under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971).  We exercise plenary review over the legal determinations 
of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been met 
and, if so, we review the district court's decision to abstain 
for abuse of discretion.  O'Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 
790 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1355 (1995). 
 Three requirements must be met before Younger 
abstention is appropriate: (1) there must be an ongoing state 
judicial proceeding to which the federal plaintiff is a party and 
with which the federal proceeding will interfere, (2) the state 
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  The individual plaintiffs have an additional argument 
supporting their view that Rooker-Feldman does not bar their 
federal court challenges.  As we have stated, "Rooker-Feldman 
does not bar individual constitutional claims by persons not 
parties to earlier state court litigation . . . ."  Valenti, 962 
F.2d at 298. Drawing an analogy to concepts of claim preclusion 
and issue preclusion, however, in this particular case we would 
group the individual plaintiffs together with FOCUS for both 
Younger and Rooker-Feldman purposes.  Cf. 18 Charles A. Wright et 
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4456, at 491-92 (1981 & Supp. 
1995). 
proceedings must implicate important state interests, and (3) the 
state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise 
the constitutional claims.  Port Auth., 973 F.2d at 173.  We 
conclude that the first requirement is not present here.  The 
judge's refusal to accept or to rule upon FOCUS' motion to 
intervene means that FOCUS was never a party in state court--and 
there was no ongoing case for Younger purposes--until FOCUS filed 
its King's Bench petition in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
Since that proceeding had been terminated without an adjudication 
of the constitutional issue at the time of the filing of the 
federal complaint, Younger abstention was improper. 
 The parties agree that the Baby Byron case is 
"ongoing."  Still, while the Baby Byron case is ongoing in the 
usual sense, it is not "ongoing" for Younger purposes because 
FOCUS has never been allowed to intervene and cannot there secure 
an adjudication of its constitutional claim.  The defendants 
acknowledge, as they must, that FOCUS never became a party to the 
custody hearings.  The best they can do is to argue that FOCUS 
tried to become a party and that this should suffice for Younger 
purposes.  While the defendants grant that FOCUS cannot secure an 
adjudication of its First Amendment claim from the court of 
common pleas with the state case in its present posture, they 
propose a rule that any party who attempts unsuccessfully to 
intervene in a state proceeding may not seek federal relief 
unless and until she has exhausted any possibility of overturning 
the decision on intervention.  This would include, in the 
defendants' view, filing a King's Bench petition seeking an order 
permitting intervention. 
 We find no basis for implying a duty to exhaust all 
available state process in pursuit of intervention and, 
accordingly, see no reason why FOCUS, once rejected by the court 
of common pleas, was not free to seek relief immediately from a 
federal court.  Our observations in Marks about Younger 
abstention are equally applicable here: 
[I]t is . . . important to recognize that a 
person with a federal Civil Rights Act claim 
has no duty to exhaust state remedies before 
pursuing his or her claim in the federal 
courts.  Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 
496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). 
Younger principles must be applied in a 
manner consistent with this well-established 
proposition.  As we noted in Monaghan v. 
Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1986), 
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 484 U.S. 
193, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988), 
"in no case has the Supreme Court or this 
court ever turned the propriety of a Younger 
dismissal upon the mere availability of a 
state judicial proceeding."  Thus, the  
plaintiffs in this proceeding could have 
proceeded in federal court without having 
resorted to the state's judicial process. 
Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.2d at 882. 
 These principles were recently applied by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in a context very similar to that 
presented here.  In Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 
1995), the plaintiffs were two anti-abortion demonstrators and a 
journalist who reports on anti-abortion demonstrations.  They 
brought a § 1983 declaratory action seeking relief from a 
Wisconsin state court injunction limiting the anti-abortion 
activities of several named state court defendants "and all 
persons acting in concert with them."  The federal plaintiffs 
were not parties to the ongoing suit in which the injunction had 
been entered but alleged that they wished to protest abortions at 
the clinics named in the injunction (or in the case of the 
journalist to write about such protests) and that they were 
deterred from engaging in First Amendment protected activity by a 
well-grounded fear that the injunction would be interpreted as 
prohibiting their activity on pain of criminal contempt.  The 
defendants in the federal proceeding raised Younger abstention as 
a bar to relief, asserting that "the plaintiffs should have 
intervened in the state court injunction proceeding and then they 
could have gotten the adjudication they want, in the state 
courts."  47 F.3d at 848.  The Court of Appeals held that there 
was no duty to intervene, observing that "nothing in Younger or 
the cases following it suggests that persons claiming a violation 
of their federal rights have an obligation before turning to 
federal court to see whether there is some state court proceeding 
they might join in order to present their federal claims there." 
Id. 
 If a would-be federal plaintiff in a civil rights 
action has no duty to attempt to intervene in an ongoing state 
suit in which he might be able to tender his constitutional 
issue, it follows, we believe, that FOCUS, once rejected by the 
court that entered the gag order, had no duty to exhaust all 
extraordinary state remedies in an attempt to intervene.  The 
Younger doctrine is based on comity and the notion that comity 
makes it undesirable to permit a party access to a federal court 
when he is currently involved in state proceedings where he can 
secure an adjudication of his constitutional claim.  We believe 
FOCUS has done everything that considerations of comity can 
reasonably require of it.  It could have gone directly to federal 
court without seeking to intervene.  Consistent with 
considerations of comity, however, it afforded the court of 
common pleas an opportunity to adjudicate its constitutional 
challenge but was rebuffed without a ruling on that challenge. 
The interests of comity would be ill served, we believe, were we 
to hold that FOCUS by so acting in the service of comity had 
erected substantial barriers to its federal court access.  We 
decline to so hold. 
 Because there is no ongoing state proceeding in which 
FOCUS can secure an adjudication of its constitutional claim, we 
hold that Younger abstention was inappropriate. 
 
V. 
 Finally, citing Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 
1995), the defendants assert "basic principles of equity" as 
alternative grounds for affirming the district court.  As we have 
explained, in Hoover potential anti-abortion protestors and a 
journalist--none of whom were named defendants in the state court 
action--sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
state court injunction on the ground that the order violated 
their rights under the First Amendment.  After first finding 
Younger inapplicable, the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court's dismissal because the remedy sought was unworkable.  
 The court reasoned: 
[The plaintiffs] want the federal court to 
tell the state judge to rewrite his 
injunction to make it clearer, to refrain 
from convicting anybody who does not really 
and truly violate the injunction as revised, 
and to tell the police chief and the judge 
not to infer that people are assisting in 
violating the injunction from their mere 
proximity to defendants named in the 
injunction.  The relief that the plaintiffs 
seek is at once an insult to the judicial and 
law enforcement officials of Wisconsin, an 
interference with an ongoing state court 
proceeding, and an empty but potentially 
mischievous command to these officials to 
avoid committing any errors in the 
enforcement of the [state court] injunction 
. . . . 
 . . .  The plaintiffs' able counsel, 
when pressed at oral argument, was unable to 
suggest a useful amendment to the injunction 
and acknowledged that what he really wants 
from the federal courts is a firm warning to 
Wisconsin officialdom that they are not to 
trample on his clients' constitutional 
rights. . . .  [T]he difficulty of framing a 
useful injunction, when considered in 
conjunction with the affront to comity that 
such an injunction would constitute and the 
nebulous and speculative character of the 
fears that have led the plaintiffs to sue, 
convinces us that this suit is an 
inappropriate invocation of the equity powers 
of the federal courts. 
 
Id. at 850-51. 
 Hoover is inapposite.  The plaintiffs in Hoover did not 
claim that the state court injunction as written violated their 
First Amendment rights; they asserted only that it was capable of 
being applied in a manner that violated those rights.  They were 
asking the federal court to warn the state court and police 
officials to enforce the injunction in a constitutional way.  The 
plaintiffs here, on the other hand, complain that the gag orders 
can only be applied in ways that infringe on their First 
Amendment rights to receive information from willing speakers who 
will not speak solely because of those orders.  While the 
district court may be confronted with a difficult merits issue 
when it attempts to reconcile First Amendment interests with 
Pennsylvania's interest in confidentiality for family court 
proceedings, there is no reason to believe that it will have any 
greater difficulty in fashioning an effective remedy than in any 
other § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of state 
action.  Thus, we cannot say that "this suit is an inappropriate 
invocation of the equity powers of the federal courts."  Id. at 
851. 
 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order granting the motion to dismiss and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
